One or two arenas? : the break-up between national and regional elections by Jurado, Ignacio et al.
This is a repository copy of One or two arenas? : the break-up between national and 
regional elections.




Jurado, Ignacio orcid.org/0000-0003-2439-3817, León, Sandra orcid.org/0000-0002-4268-
0302 and Amat, Francesc (2020) One or two arenas? : the break-up between national and 






Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
 1 
 
ONE OR TWO ARENAS? 
 
THE BREAK-UP BETWEEN NATIONAL AND 






Francesc Amat (Universitat de Barcelona) 
 
Ignacio Jurado (University of York) 
 





This paper shows that the role of national electoral dynamics on regional elections is 
highly mediated by institutional and electoral constraints at the regional level. Using 
data on statewide parties’ electoral competition in regional and national elections in 
Spain and Italy, results show that the contamination of regional elections is lower in 
regions where decentralization has travelled further and where strong regionalist parties 
dominate electoral competition. The paper also shows that these two channels -more 
regional authority and more regionalist competition- shape the regional manifestos of 
statewide parties by increasing their pro-regional positions. These findings represent a 
contribution to a better understanding of the extent to which regional elections are a 




When are regional elections independent from national electoral dynamics? Does 
the influence of national elections on regional elections vary across federal countries? If 
so, why? This paper seeks to answer these questions by exploring how decentralization 
and regionalist parties affect statewide parties’ electoral competition in the regional 
arena. The prevailing assumption in theories that espouse the efficiency or democratic 
promises of decentralization has been that electoral competition in different levels of 
government operates in separate ways, reflecting dual accountability (Rodden and 
Wibbels 2011). Yet studies on electoral competition in federations indicate that the 
electoral fate of regional incumbents is highly determined by national electoral 
dynamics (Gélineau and Bélanger, 2005, Remmer and Gélineau, 2003, Gélineau and 
Remmer, 2006, Niemi et al., 1995, Anderson, 2006a, Anderson, 2006b, Carsey and 
Wright, 1998, Hansen, 1999, Partin, 1995, Squire and Fastnow, 1994, Rogers 2017, 
among others).  
This “second-order” nature of regional elections suggests an overlap between 
electoral arenas and implies weak or distorted accountability mechanisms at the regional 
level, as the impact of national elections makes incumbents’ electoral success 
exogenous to their performance in office. However, the majority of empirical studies 
that question the independent status of regional elections are based on case-country 
studies -exceptions are Rodden and Wibbels (2011) or Schakel (2013). As a result, we 
still ignore the extent to which the “second-order” nature of regional elections varies 
across regions and the explanatory mechanisms that may account for this variation. In 
this paper we purport to make some advancement over the existing literature by 
exploring what explains the influence of federal electoral dynamics on regional 
elections in two parliamentary decentralized democracies: Spain and Italy.  
The theoretical argument of this paper is that the impact of federal elections on 
regional elections (which we denominate “contamination” effects) depends on two 
constraints at the regional level: an institutional one –the degree of regional authority; 
and an electoral one –the strength of regionalist parties. Following previous theoretical 
works in the area (Authors 2014) we hypothesize that contamination will be lower in 
regions that have been endowed with extensive political and fiscal authority or where 
statewide parties face strong electoral competition from regionalist parties. Drawing on 
electoral results in regional in Spain and Italy for the 1980-2010 (Spain) and 1947-2010 
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(Italy) periods, results show that there is high variation in the effect of national electoral 
results on regional elections. In line with the hypotheses of the article, levels of 
decentralization and the strength of regionalist parties explain this variation both across 
regions and over time. 
This article extends extant research in different ways. First, the paper provides a 
theory on the electoral impact of federal elections on the regional arena that is grounded 
on politicians’ individual-level incentives. This approach helps to advance a literature 
that has provided extensive empirical evidence on the role of national elections in the 
subnational arena, but has lacked a sound development of the underlying theoretical 
mechanisms. Second, the empirical analysis in the paper makes some progress over 
recent contributions in the literature on territorial politics by providing a more nuanced 
estimation of national coattails in regional elections and by introducing a comparative 
approach that explores variation both across regions and over time1.   
 
Decentralization, Party Systems and Contamination effects 
Since the path-breaking work on federalism by William Riker (Riker, 1964), 
scholars keep paying attention to the degree of integration of the party system to 
understand patterns of political competition across electoral tiers, the degree of 
contamination between federal and regional arenas, and its implications upon the 
stability of federations. A crucial condition to understand whether party systems in 
federations become more or less integrated is the degree of interdependence between 
the regional and the federal electoral arena, what the literature defines as the degree of 
“contamination” (Schakel 2013) between elections.2 
The more normative accounts on decentralization from the Welfare Economics  
literature (Oates 1972) assume that voters are simply expected to track incumbents’ 
performance at different levels of government and hold them responsible only for the 
powers they control. Regional elections therefore operate as a separate electoral arena, 
independent from national electoral competition (Rodden and Wibbels 2011).The more 
positive approach in the literature on electoral competition in decentralized contexts 
 
1 The most common measure in the literature has been a “dissimilarity index”, (Schakel 2013)which 
measures the proportion of the electorate who would have to change their vote in order for the regional 
election to exhibit the same results as in the previous federal election in that region (see authors 2014 on 
the limitations of this index).   
2 Other literature refers to this as electoral externalities (Rodden and Wibbels 2011). 
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shows that the reality of regional elections is a far cry from the normative ideal: regional 
elections operate as a second-order arena, where voters cast their vote taking into 
account national issues or use the regional arena to support more preferred (but less 
viable) political parties (Reif and Schmitt 1980). However, new empirical evidence 
questions the second order nature of regional elections (see Schakel 2013, 2015; 
Schakel and Jeffery 2013; Dandoy and Schakel 2013; Clark and Rohrschneider 2009) 
and explores the conditions under which the electoral fate of regional politicians is more 
or less contingent upon regional performance and policy outcomes than upon national 
electoral dynamics (Cabeza et al. 2016).  
The degree of interdependence between regional and federal elections is not a 
static feature of decentralized systems, but it may vary across institutional settings as 
well as over time. For instance, Schakel and Jeffery (2013) show that the second-order 
nature of regional elections is weaker in regions with high levels of decentralization and 
where non-statewide parties compete in regional elections. In addition, changes in levels 
of regional authority over time may weaken the role of national dynamics in regional 
elections (León 2014).  
The effect of decentralization upon the second-order nature of regional elections 
is moderated by how political parties are internally organized and, in turn, by how they 
design their electoral strategies in regional elections. In more decentralized contexts 
state parties tend to be more autonomous from the national party line (Thorlakson 
2009), which may contribute to a more “regionalized” pattern of electoral competition; 
whereas in more centralized federations political parties are more integrated3,4. 
Likewise, decentralizing reforms in countries such as United Kingdom, Italy, Spain or 
Belgium have shifted the balance of organizational power within statewide parties from 
the federal party to state parties (Swenden and Maddens, 2009:16, Detterbeck and 
Jeffery, 2009:71, León-Alfonso, 2007:193 and ff., Fabre and Méndez-Lago, 2009:117). 
Statewide parties may not only implement changes in their internal organization in 
reaction to decentralization reforms, but also in their electoral platforms and message to 
continue to win seats across the territory (Hopkin (2003, 2009). The “regionalization” 
 
3 Thorlakson (2009) shows that in layer cake models like Canada or US where subnational governments 
exercise have large powers over taxes and expenditures that are separate from the federal government, 
subnational branches become more autonomous. Conversely, in marble cake federal models like 
Germany or Austria, parties are more integrated and intergovernmental cooperation becomes smoother. 
4 The formal distribution of powers that is enshrined in party statutes does not quite capture the actual 
balance of power between national and subnational party elites: changes in formal internal organization 
may only happen well after a modification of regional-national power relations has been in place.  
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of statewide parties’ electoral platforms may contribute to reinforce the “first-order” 
nature of regional elections by enhancing its independence from national electoral 
dynamics.  
Finally, the extent to which regional elections become a second-order election 
has a lot to do with how much information voters hold about regional policy outcomes 
and whether they take it into account to evaluate regional incumbents. Decentralization 
may complicate the assignment of responsibilities over policy outcomes because policy 
competences are shared between the federal and the regional administration. If 
responsibility assignments are blurred, voters may end up using national policy 
outcomes as shortcuts to evaluate regional incumbents (which increases the 
interdependence between national and regional elections). However, clarity of 
responsibilities may be enhanced where decentralization has followed a more 
differentiated distribution of responsibilities (a “layer-cake” type of responsibility 
allocation, see León 2011). In contexts with higher clarity of responsibility it is more 
likely that voters support regional incumbents on the basis of regional policy outcomes 
(which increases the “first-order” nature of regional elections, that is, its 
“independence” from national dynamics (Anderson 2006a; León and Orriols 2017).  
The study of decentralization and its effects on statewide parties’ electoral 
competition in the national and regional arena is not new. This approach has taken up a 
significant part of the literature on European territorial politics (Hough and Jeffery, 
2006; Hough and Kob, 2009; Jeffery and Hough, 2009). However, in these studies 
voters are assumed to adopt a more regional logic of voting behavior in decentralized 
contexts but it is not clear what causes this change. This paper builds on previous 
theoretical works in the area (Authors 2014) and helps to advance the literature by 
focusing on regional elites’ electoral incentives as the explanatory mechanism that 
moderates the effect of decentralization upon the degree of contamination between the 
federal and the regional arena. In addition, it testes the hypotheses in two countries that 
exhibit significant variation in decentralization both across regions and over time: Italy 
and Spain.  
 
The Argument 
We argue the impact of federal electoral results on regional elections will 
decrease when subnational elites of statewide parties have incentives to follow 
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differentiated electoral strategies from their national co-partisans. Pursuing a 
differentiated electoral strategy or sticking to the national party guidelines involve 
different costs and benefits. The incentives of a regional politician of a statewide party 
to follow a differentiated (and more regional-oriented) electoral strategy from her 
national counterparts are contingent upon the institutional and electoral constraints they 
face at the regional level, namely: (i) the nature of decentralized powers and regional 
authority; and (ii) the existence of regionalist parties that challenge statewide parties’ 
electoral support.   
 
The Institutional Constraint: Decentralization and the contamination 
between electoral arenas 
Subnational elites’ electoral incentives are driven by a cost-benefit electoral 
calculus when deciding about adopting independent policy strategies versus 
accommodating to the preferences of the national elite. The fundamental idea is that 
decentralization fosters the incentives of statewide parties’ regional leaders to follow 
independent electoral strategies by increasing their associated benefits and diminishing 
their costs. 
First, high levels of decentralization increase the benefits associated to regional 
office. When decentralization is high decentralization, regional governments have more 
decision-making and financing powers. This means that regional governments control a 
higher share of total public expenditures and will have decision-making capacity over 
its financing. In this context, regional leaders of statewide parties will have incentives to 
develop policy programs that are different from the national party agenda (Mazzoleni 
2009). High levels of decentralization enable subnational politicians to address 
particular demands of regional constituencies and therefore to increase the likelihood of 
their political survival without depending on their national counterpart. Put differently, 
when decentralization of fiscal and political powers increases, differentiated policy 
programs become an appealing electoral strategy to allow the regional leader of a 
statewide party to adapt her electoral pledges to specific regional conditions, 
constituencies and interest groups (Alonso and Gómez 2010; Detterbeck and Jeffery 
2009:71). 
Second, as stated above, previous studies show that decentralization is 
associated with a process of centrifugation of the party organization (see Hepburn 2018 
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for a review). As decentralization unfolds, the balance of power within statewide parties 
flows from the national elite towards subnational copartisans, who improve their 
leverage within the party organization (Swenden and Madden 2009: 16). Greater 
autonomy of regional leaders diminishes the potential costs associated with the 
development of strategies that deviate from the position of the statewide party as a 
whole (Maddens and Libbrecht 2009: 228). In addition, the opportunity costs of 
following a differentiation strategy also decrease with higher levels of decentralization 
as the possibility of running a regional-level political career is more attractive for a 
given individual politician (Myerson 2006, Borchert and Stolz 2011, Cordero and 
Coller 2014). 
Both ways, we expect that higher decentralization should be associated with 
higher incentives (increasing benefits and diminishing costs) by subnational elites to 
follow differentiated party strategies and independent policy agendas. Given this, as 
decentralization unfolds heterogeneous regional policy programs should increase the 
visibility of regional party leaders against their national copartisans, which will enhance 
the “first-order” nature of regional elections. This means that the regional arena is no 
longer regarded as a simple mirror of the national arena. In summary, we assume that 
decentralization affects national coattails through the pathway of differentiated party 
strategies. As decentralization increases it is an optimal strategy for both the federal 
party leader and the regional elite of statewide parties to allow and develop this 
differentiation strategy to become more competitive in regional elections –even if the 
price to pay is some centrifugation of the party. Unless the national party leader is 
willing to assume the risk of losing in some regional elections, he should be able to 
sacrifice at least partially the degree of party unity and the degree of homogenization of 
its regional platforms across the territory.  
 
The Electoral Constraint: Regionalist Parties and Contamination effects 
There is an additional constraint that may enhance regional leaders of statewide 
parties to follow independent policy agendas: electoral competition with regionalist 
parties. The existence of political competition with strong regionalist parties directly 
threatens the political power of statewide parties at the subnational level. Oftentimes 
regionalist parties put forward demands for greater regional authority and fiscal powers. 
As a consequence, regionalist parties change dramatically the landscape of party 
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competition at the regional level. Subnational copartisans of statewide parties may need 
to address the electoral demands for greater autonomy of regionalist parties when 
competing for regional office. They will be more likely to engage in electoral 
campaigning centered on regional interests and centrifugal demands to preserve voters 
that otherwise might defect and vote for regionalist parties (Meguid 2015). As Bélanger 
et al. (2018) state, in regions with strong regionalist parties (such as Québec and 
Scotland), the “national question” becomes “the structural pillar of electoral politics” 
(2018: 17).  if competing for regional office involves championing regional interests, 
regional copartisans will be less prone to abide by the position of the statewide party as 
a whole and more likely to follow differentiated strategies. Therefore, we expect that 
contamination effects will decrease in those jurisdictions where statewide parties face 
an electoral threat from regionalist parties. 
Thus, we can summarize our main hypotheses in the following way: 
Hypothesis 1 (Institutional constraint effect): Statewide parties’ contamination 
effects will be lower, the higher the levels of political and fiscal decentralization.  
Hypothesis 2 (Electoral constraint effect):  Statewide parties’ contamination effects 
for statewide parties will be lower, the higher the electoral strength of regionalist parties 
in subnational elections. 
To test these hypotheses, our empirical analysis is two-fold. In the first part, we 
analyze contamination effects in regional elections in Spain and Italy. In these countries 
decentralization has proceeded in a spiral dynamic and devolution of responsibilities has 
been asymmetric across regions. In Spain, after the 1978 Spanish Constitution, there 
were 10 regions (known as “ordinary regions”) that accessed autonomy through the 
slow-track procedure, which involved initial lower levels of power. The mixed-track 
regions -Catalonia, Galicia, Andalusia, Comunidad Valenciana, and Canary Islands- 
accessed autonomy with more far-reaching powers. Finally, fast-track regions - the 
Basque Country, and  Navarre – were additionally endowed with a different system of 
financing that granted them full autonomy over taxation. The case of Italy also exhibits 
great variation in decentralization, both between regions and over time. After World 
War II, the five regions (Aosta Valley, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, and 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol) with most pronounced cultural and linguistic differences 
were granted a special statute. These statutes covered powers on many areas, and, 
depending on the region, different fiscal capacity. On the other hand, the remaining 15 
regions with ordinary statute were not created until 1970. Their levels of autonomy have 
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also varied over time, since the 2001 constitutional reform augmented their legislative 
powers and slightly increased their fiscal autonomy. 
This means that the most important source of variation in Italy and Spain is 
between regions and over time. Accordingly, we explore regional differences in 
contamination effects and we test whether they vary consistently with our hypotheses. 
With this aim, we analyze whether increasing levels of decentralization in Spanish and 
Italian regions decrease the influence of the national arena on the regional one over 
time.  In addition, we explore if contamination effects from national elections are lower 
in those Italian and Spanish regions with stronger regionalist parties. We predict higher 
contamination effects in those regions where levels of decentralized authority are low 
and where statewide parties do not face strong competition from regionalist parties5.  
Secondly, to explore further the electoral incentives of the regional elites we also test 
how both decentralization and party competition affects the regional party platforms of 
statewide parties in Spain and their positions on the center-periphery dimension using 
data on regional manifestos. 
 
 
A cross-regional analysis of electoral contamination effects in Italy and 
Spain 
 
We test our hypotheses using panel models. For the Spanish case we run panel 
data models at the region-party level that also include region-party fixed effects6. The 
average number of observations at the region-party level is 6.5 and therefore we can 
exploit a significant amount of variation over time (elections) within a given party in a 
given region –i.e. at the region-party level. For Italy, instead, we do not include region-
party fixed effects because the average number of observations at region-party level is 
much lower. All models, for both Spain and Italy, also include period effect dummies to 
account for unobserved time-related heterogeneity. We include the same controls and 
follow the same parsimonious strategy in both countries. Finally, the standard errors are 
clustered at the region-party level to account for the region-party structure of our data. 
 
5 We are focusing here on electoral results. For an analysis of the differential impact of national elections 
on individual-level behavior in regional elections across regions, see Liñeira (2016). 
6 The models do not include a lag dependent variable (LDV) in order to avoid a potential Nickell bias in 
our estimates. The results are robust, however, to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable.  
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In the Online Appendix, though, we include further robustness checks in which we do 
not cluster at the region-party level and the results remain the same.  
On one hand, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes in regional 
elections of statewide party j at time t in region i [Regional Election Share]. Thus, we 
can directly include measures of decentralization and the strength of regionalist parties 
at the regional level that will assist us in capturing differences between regions. On the 
other hand, the main independent variable of interest is the percentage of votes of party 
j in region i in the previous national election [t-k]  [National Election Share], where k is 
the number of years between regional elections and previous national elections. Hence, 
our unit of analysis is the party-region-election. Therefore, we operationalize 
contamination effects as the impact of previous national electoral outcomes in 
subsequent regional electoral results. The higher the coefficient of National Electoral 
Share, the higher the impact of national elections on regional ones.  
Additional variables measured at the time of regional elections [t] are included 
as covariates in all models. We introduce the number of days passed between national 
and regional elections and its interaction with the electoral result in the previous 
national election. It is reasonable to expect that the impact of national elections on 
regional electoral results will become weaker the longer the time span between national 
and regional elections (Jeffery and Hough 2009, Schakel and Dandoy 2014). National 
elections that take place well before regional elections will be less influential than 
national elections that take place a few months before or at the same time than regional 
elections. 
We also include further controls related to the incumbency status of parties and 
type of regional government. The variable Affiliated is coded as 1 when the regional 
government belongs to the ruling party at the national level and Prime Minister is a 
dummy variable that measures whether party j rules the regional government. An 
affiliated incumbent may face an electoral disadvantage in regional elections as a 
consequence of the midterm punishment effect (Rodden and Wibbels, 2011:7, Hough 
and Jeffery, 2006:126). To control for this effect, we interact the Affiliation and Prime 
Minister variables. Finally, clarity of responsibilities is lower in coalition governments 
(Powell and Whitten 1993), which may weaken the impact of performance on the 
electoral support of regional incumbent parties (Thorlakson 2016). Accordingly, the 
Coalition Member variable measures whether party j belongs to a coalition government 
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at the regional level. We expect that the blame avoidance game between members of the 
coalition allow parties to survive better to electoral accountability. 
First, we start investigating the “institutional constraint effect” in the two 
countries by including an interaction term between National Election Share and a 
measure of decentralization. Since we are interested in a measure of decentralization 
that varies both across time and regions we use the Self Rule Index developed by 
Hooghe et al (2016). This variable allows us to capture the level of authority exercised 
by a regional government over those within the regional territory. The Self-Rule index is 
introduced at the time of the previous national election, which means that effectively we 
use one lag, as we expect institutional constraints at time t to have an influence on the 
following electoral contests7. We then turn to test the “electoral constraint hypothesis” 
by adding an interaction term between the National Election Share at time t-k and the 
strength of regionalist parties in the previous term –which is equivalent to using a lag 
value. We constructed the Regionalist Parties Share variable, which measures the 
electoral strength of regionalist parties in the subnational legislature before regional 
elections take place. Specifically, this variables codes the vote share in the region of 
those parties that: 1) get seat representation in the regional assembly; 2) compete just in 
some regions, and not in the whole country; 3) the party’s manifesto contains claims for 
more autonomy (or secession). Therefore, the interaction between National Election 
Share and Regionalist Parties Share serves to test the second hypothesis, as it captures 
whether the impact of national coattails in regional elections varies according to the 
electoral strength of regionalist parties.  
Models reported in Table 1 show how both the degree of self-rule at the regional 
level and the dynamics of party competition affect the prevalence of regional electoral 
arenas in Spain8. Models 1.1 and 1.2 include gradually the two interaction terms, and 
models 1.3 and 1.4 include the set of controls and the period fixed effects. As expected, 
the negative and significant coefficient for the interaction terms between the national 
electoral shares and the lag of the self-rule component of the regional authority index 
estimated in Table 1 indicate that the greater the level of decentralization in a particular 
 
7 In the Online Appendix we show results using the more general Regional Authority Index, which remain 
the same. We also display in the Appendix analyses using contemporaneous values that yield insignificant 
estimators, confirming that changes in the two hypothesized channels precede changes in the level of 
contamination. 
8 The analyses show the results for PP and PSOE. In Navarre, PP contests in some elections as part of a 
coalition with UPN, which at the same time can be labelled as a regionalist party. We do not include the 
results for this party in this region. 
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region, the lower the contamination effects in the next electoral contest for those 
statewide parties that compete in that region. Given that the models exploit within 
region-party variation, the results imply that as decentralization levels have increased 
over time in Spain, contamination effects have declined. 
On the other hand, the interaction between National Election Share and 
Regionalist Parties Share is also negative and significant. These results provide 
evidence that contamination effects become less important in regions with a higher 
degree of autonomy and, alternatively, when there are strong regionalist parties. In other 
words, the separation between electoral arenas is greater in the Comunidades 
Autónomas either when regionalist parties are strong or when regional self-rule powers 
are high. This either/or regarding the two potential mechanisms is important because it 
confirms that the two channels operate separately: the institutional and the electoral one. 
This finding also corroborates previous empirical analyses (León 2014). Regarding the 
effect of the covariates, as expected there is an incumbent effect since when a party 
rules the regional government its electoral returns increase. We also find a negative 
effect for the coalition dummy in Spain, which means that statewide parties do not 
benefit from being in regional coalition governments. The controls for the electoral 
timing (days passed) and partisan affiliation do not have statistically significant effects. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Models depicted in Table 2 report very similar results for the Italian case. 
Results confirm the support for our two main hypotheses and corroborate that they also 
operate separately in Italy. As before, the interaction term between the regional self-rule 
index and the national electoral shares is negative and significant across all models. 
However, the results in models 2.2 and 2.4 also show that the greater the electoral share 
of regionalist parties, the lower the contamination effects for statewide parties in 
subsequent regional elections. Taken altogether, models in Table 2 suggest that the 
increase in decentralization levels across many Italian regions plus the increase of the 
electoral strength of regionalist parties are causing a gradual reduction in contamination 
effects in Italy. In other words, the changing dynamics of regional party competition 
and the increasing decentralization trends are jointly affecting the extent to which 
national coattails impact subnational elections. 
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In order to illustrate and summarize the last set of results for Spain and Italy, 
Figures 1 and 2 show how the marginal effects capturing contamination effects vary 
depending on the values of the Regional Self Rule index and the Regionalist Parties 
Share at the regional-level. In both figures, the decreasing marginal effects show the 
role of the electoral and institutional constraints. Again, it is striking to observe how 
similar the results are when comparing Spain and Italy. In Spain, in regions where the 
degree of self-rule is low or moderately low the contamination effects are almost one-
to-one. However, in regions where self-rule is higher (when it takes value 15), the 
contamination effects decline to 0.5. In other words, just 4 points-difference in the self-
rule index explain a reduction of more than a half in the estimated contamination. On 
the other hand, when the strength of regionalist parties is high or very high (above 40% 
of the vote shares), then the contamination effects are also lower than 0.5.  
In Italy, the picture is very similar. A greater self-rule component of regional 
authority is associated with much lower contamination effects. Effectively, when the 
self-rule index increases 5 points (from 10 to 15), the electoral contamination declines 
from 0.77 to 0.55. The magnitude of this effect is less pronounced, however, than the 
one estimated for the Spanish case. On the other hand, the strength of regionalist parties 
is also associated with lower electoral contamination. If regionalist parties are non-
existing or very weak, then the contamination effect is around 0.8. However, in regions 
where regionalist parties get 40% or more of the vote shares, the electoral 
contamination declines to levels below 0.6. This effect is therefore more similar in 
magnitude to the one estimated for the Spanish case. Regarding the covariates, we also 
find a regional incumbent effect and a positive effect of belonging to a regional 
coalition government, which is coherent with the expectations that parties can benefit 
from blurring responsibilities in a coalition. Similar to the Spanish case, we do not find 
significant effects for the electoral timing variables and neither for the partisan 
affiliation. 
[FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Testing the Mechanism. Regional Party Platforms of Statewide Parties: the 
Spanish Case 
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In the theoretical section we argued that the mechanisms that account for lower 
contamination in contexts where decentralization and regionalist vote share are high 
effects are related to the electoral incentives of statewide parties’ subnational elites. To 
test this mechanism in a more direct way, we use data from Spain, and specifically from 
the Regional Manifestos Project (Gómez et al. 2012). These data provide measures of 
the position on the center-periphery dimension for the regional election manifestos of 
Spanish parties (unfortunately data for Italy are limited to one electoral cycle, so we 
cannot use it for this analysis).  
If the mechanism that we propose to explain the results is right, we should 
expect that in the regions with higher levels of decentralization and with stronger 
regionalist parties, the subnational elites of state wide parties will compete on more 
regional platforms that will place a stronger emphasis both on regional issues and the 
center-periphery dimension9. León (2017) provided some initial evidence elite survey 
data that within-party variation in preferences towards regional self-rule of 
parliamentary elites are explained by the type of region where they are elected and the 
arena where they are elected (national vs. regional).  
To test this mechanism, we take data from the regional manifestos of PP and 
PSOE in all regional elections since the transition to democracy. We use two dependent 
variables. First, we use the position of each regional manifesto in the center-periphery 
dimension. This variable allows us to capture how much a subnational branch of a 
statewide party centers its electoral pledge around the territorial dimension and, more 
specifically, in terms of competing on a platform that demands more power to the 
regions. Secondly, we use the ratio between the position in the center-periphery 
dimension in each regional election manifesto and the average position of the center 
periphery in all regional election manifestos. This variable allows us to capture how 
much a subnational branch of a state-wide party deviates from its party in terms of the 
position in the territorial dimension in their electoral platform and, more specifically, in 
terms of making an electoral pledge for more power to the regions. When the variable 
has a value above 1, it means that the subnational branch has a more pro-periphery 
position than parties’ average, while a value blow 1 implies a more pro-center position. 
Using these two dependent variables, we run regressions to test the effect of our two 
 
9 Notwithstanding our argument, Muller and Bernauer (2018) analyze parties’s regional deviations from 
national-level position in Switzerland and account for other ideological, temporal, vote- and canto-
specific factors that can explain variation in the positions. 
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main independent variables: level of self-rule in the region and regionalist vote share. 
The OLS regressions include regional dummies, several covariates10, and clustered 
standard errors. 
Results are presented in Table 3 and validate our main mechanisms. First, we 
can observe that the level of self-rule in a particular region explains whether a statewide 
party takes a stronger position in the center-periphery dimension in that region 
compared to the average regional branch of the same party [Models 3.1 and 3.4]. In 
addition, when we include the regionalist party strength in the previous election, the 
effect goes in the same direction [Models 3.2 and 3.5]. State wide parties position 
themselves more extremely in the center-periphery dimension in regions with stronger 
regionalist parties. When both variables are included in the models, both of them keep 
their sign as well as conventional levels of significance [Models 3.3 and 3.6]11.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Results show that where the institutional and electoral constraints are stronger, regional 
politicians of statewide parties will design more independent electoral platforms, which 
that will make their results less dependent on the electoral fate of their national branch. 
These processes, however, are obviously self-reinforcing. To address concerns of 
endogeneity, we run two difference-in-difference analyses. We exploit two seemingly 
exogeneous shocks that are related to our hypotheses. First, we analyze the effect upon 
regional manifestos of a significant increase in decentralization in Spain in 2002, when 
Spanish slow-track regions were endowed with health care powers. As we mentioned 
above, some regions in Spain accessed to self-rule with more limited powers (slow-
track regions), although it was foreseen in the Spanish Constitution that they could ask 
for an upgrading of competences five years after the approval of their Statute of 
Autonomy. An agreement about the upgrading of slow-track regions’ competences 
actually took place during the second half of the 1990s. The gap in expenditure powers 
between slow-track and the rest was virtually closed in 2002, with the transfer of health 
care powers to ten slow-track regions.  
 
10 We include as a covariates the vote share of the party at the regional level in national elections, the 
subnational left-right position of the regional manifesto -as Massetti and Schakel (2015) have shown that 
left wing positions in Spain they can correlate with party’s regionalism-, and the saliency of the center-
periphery dimension in the regional manifesto, as well as the regional dummies. 
11 In alternative analyses not reported here, we have replicated the model specification including an 
interaction between both dependent variables. However, we do not find interactive effects. Both variables 
seem to have independent and unconditional effects. 
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To test the effect of further decentralization on regional manifestos, we therefore 
use 2002 as a cutoff point. We analyze the center-periphery position of the regional 
election manifestos of PP and PSOE pre-2002 and post-2002 and account for the 
differences in the changes in slow-track regions compared to the rest. To do a controlled 
comparison, we only include manifestos from the five previous and subsequent years to 
the cutoff-point. In figure 3 we show the difference-in-difference estimator. As we can 
see, there is a clear positive impact of further decentralization on the pro-periphery 
position of statewide parties in regional elections. On average, slow-track regions 
increased in 8 points their positions in the centre-periphery dimension. The average 
position is 5.8 and the standard deviation is 9.4, so the effect is sizeable. 
As a robustness check we run two further tests. First, we replicate the analysis 
but only comparing slow-track regions with mixed-track regions. We exclude from the 
comparison the Basque country and Navarre as those were regions that already had 
higher powers. The magnitude of the effect decreases slightly, but the significance 
increases. Secondly, we use a placebo test and provide the diff-in-diff estimator of slow-
track regions compared to the rest, but using 2004 as a cutoff point. This is the year 
Rodríguez Zapatero became President and pushed a wave of reforms in regional 
constitutions that increased the pro-decentralization positions of both PP and PSOE in 
many regions. We see no significant impact on the differential changes in the center-
periphery positions of statewide parties when using 2004 as cut-off point. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Our second hypothesis refers to the impact of regionalist electoral competition 
on the regional electoral agendas of statewide parties. To account for this mechanism 
we run a diff-in-diff analysis using 2008 as a cutoff point. This is the year the financial 
crisis started. Previous research argues that economic crises may contribute to fragment 
national party systems by spurring grievances from regionalist parties and, in turn, by 
increasing their electoral strength (Jurado and León 2017). Following this argument, we 
expect that in those Spanish regions where regionalist parties have been traditionally 
strongest, the economic crisis will result in a more intense regionalist threat and, as a 
result,  state wide parties will react by increasing in those regions their regional electoral 
agendas’ pro-periphery positions. We test this argument in the four Spanish regions 
where regionalist parties have been traditionally strong: Catalonia, Basque Country, 
Galicia, and the Canary Islands. All of them have consistently had strong regionalist 
representation in their regional assemblies, and therefore those are the regions were an 
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exogeneous shock is more likely to result in increasing competition around centre-
periphery issues (as compared to the remaining regions). In a second operationalization, 
we also test the argument including Navarre and Cantabria in the “regionalist” group of 
regions12.  
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Results are exhibited in Figure 4. They show that in both cases the diff-in-diff 
estimator point to a positive effect of the crisis on the pro-periphery positions of 
statewide parties in regions where regionalism is prevalent. On average, the impact is of 
almost 4 points in the center-periphery scale. This confirms that an exogenous shock 
like the financial crisis, which can have an effect on encouraging regionalist demands of 
regionalist parties, induces an adaptation of the regional branches of statewide parties to 
electoral pledges that gravitate around the territorial dimension. As a robustness check, 
we use the same placebo as in the previous analysis, yielding, as expected, an 
insignificant estimator.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has shown that the impact of national elections on regional elections 
is highly moderated by institutional and electoral constraints at the regional level. The 
empirical analysis shows that contamination effects are lower in regions where 
decentralization has travelled further. Empirical results also corroborate that 
contamination decreases in regional elections where strong regionalist parties dominate 
electoral competition. Finally, we have also shown that these constraints affect the 
position on the center-periphery dimension of regional branches of statewide parties. 
There are several ways in which these results could be extended. One potential 
research path is to provide further empirical evidence on the causal pathway that relates 
decentralization with contamination effects. In this paper, the causal mechanism at the 
theoretical level establishes regional elites’ strategies as the most important moderating 
factor between institutional reforms and changes in individuals’ voting behavior in 
national and regional elections. We have also provided a first test of this mechanism. 
Further research could explore from a qualitative approach more precisely the extent to 
 
12 In these two regions, regionalism has been also above 20%. In Cantabria regionalism has been high since 
the mid-nineties mostly due to PRC (Partido Regionalista de Cantabria) 
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which the electoral agendas and strategies of the regional leaders of statewide parties 
are gradually shaped by increasing decentralization and regionalist parties’ competition. 
A second research path is to develop comparative work on political parties and 
how they moderate the relationship between decentralization and contamination effects. 
In this paper we have not differentiated among national statewide parties, but further 
research could explore whether ideology, organization or historical party trajectories 
may account for variation in the way decentralization affects party organization and, in 
turn, the breakup of electoral arenas. 
Our paper also encourages further analysis of the implications of contamination 
effects on regional accountability. As stated in the introduction, national coattails may 
decrease the incentives of regional incumbents to be responsive to the demands of their 
constituencies, as their electoral results depend on factors other than regional 
performance. However, that decentralization weakens the influence of the national 
electoral arena does not necessarily mean that regional accountability is enhanced. 
Further analysis is needed showing that a weakening of electoral interdependence 
makes regional incumbents’ electoral fate more reliant on their performance in office. 
Finally, exploring the contamination between statewide parties’ federal and 
regional electoral results has some implications that go well beyond the study of 
electoral patterns of competition. As some theorists argue, the degree of stability of the 
federation is highly dependent on the degree of centralization and integration of the 
party system (Riker 1964). By analyzing the explanatory factors of centrifugal electoral 
dynamics within statewide parties, this paper contributes to the development of an 
electoral logic of the stability of federal and decentralized arrangements. In turn, it may 
ultimately affect the stability of the federal bargain. Further exploration of these 
incentives and the relation between national and regional arenas may contribute to a 
better understanding of the extent to which some of the efficiency and stability promises 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Table 1         
SPAIN: Contamination Effects Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 
          
National Electoral Share 2.669*** 3.698*** 2.862*** 3.379*** 
 (0.598) (0.917) (0.800) (0.807) 
Self-Rule Index (lag) 7.778*** 10.500*** 8.937*** 8.450*** 
 (1.849) (2.381) (2.881) (2.772) 
 National Electoral Share X Self Rule Index (lag) -0.158*** -0.229*** -0.163** -0.192*** 
 (0.045) (0.065) (0.063) (0.062) 
Regionalist Parties Share (lag)  0.309**  0.293*** 
  (0.123)  (0.103) 
National Electoral Share X Reg. Parties Share (lag)  -0.006*  -0.006** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Regional Prime Minister   7.860*** 8.400*** 
   (1.680) (1.624) 
Affiliated   -0.164 0.263 
   (2.041) (2.113) 
Regional PM X Affiliated   -4.404 -4.820 
   (2.737) (2.849) 
Coalition Member   -3.250*** -3.782*** 
   (1.066) (1.027) 
Days Passed    0.006 0.007 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
National Electoral Share X Days Passed    -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -89.545*** -131.003*** -113.318*** -113.076*** 
 (24.100) (33.300) (37.099) (35.446) 
     
Region-Party Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Period Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES 
Observations 212 211 212 211 
R-squared 0.442 0.463 0.543 0.555 
Number of RP (party-regions) 33 33 33 33 
Clustered standard errors at the region-party level in parentheses    














Table 2         
ITALY: Contamination Effects Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
          
National Electoral Share 1.715*** 1.638*** 1.437*** 1.236*** 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.238) (0.199) 
Self-Rule Index (lag) 1.381*** 1.332*** 0.606 0.473 
 (0.390) (0.396) (0.382) (0.394) 
National Electoral Share X Self Rule Index (lag) -0.090*** -0.082*** -0.063** -0.041* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.021) 
Regionalist Parties Share (lag)  -0.051  0.016 
  (0.041)  (0.046) 
National Electoral Share X Reg. Parties Share (lag)   -0.003  -0.006*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Regional Prime Minister   3.662*** 3.755*** 
   (1.338) (1.330) 
Affiliated   0.831* 0.705 
   (0.468) (0.451) 
Regional PM X Affiliated   -0.756 -0.416 
   (0.966) (0.990) 
Coalition Member    1.541*** 1.509*** 
   (0.479) (0.528) 
Days Passed    0.000 0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
National Electoral Share X Days Passed    -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -10.376*** -9.363** -2.785 -0.666 
 (4.006) (3.948) (3.892) (4.002) 
     
Region-Party Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO 
Period Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES 
Observations 369 369 298 298 
Number of RP (party-regions) 124 124 117 117 
Clustered standard errors at the region-party level in parentheses    















Dependent Variable:  
Center-periphery position 
Dependent Variable:  
Deviation from Center-periphery average 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 Model 3.5 Model 3.6 
       
Self-Rule Index  0.654**  0.661** 0.113**  0.114** 
 (0.282)  (0.292) (0.0486)  (0.0503) 
Regionalist Parties 
Share 
 0.0415* 0.0413**  0.00715* 0.00712** 
  (0.0210) (0.0187)  (0.00361) (0.00323) 
       
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 180 178 178 180 178 178 
R-squared 0.971 0.971 0.972 0.971 0.971 0.972 


























FIGURE 3: DIFF-IN-DIFF ESTIMATORS. EFFECT OF 
DECENTRALIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES  
 
Note: Markers show the diff-in-diff estimators. 90% confidence intervals 
 
 
FIGURE 4: DIFF-IN-DIFF ESTIMATORS. EFFECT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Note: Markers show the diff-in-diff estimators. 90% confidence intervals 
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APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE OF ANALYSIS  
 
Table A.1: Sample of analysis 
Country Elections Parties Period 
Italy Regional Elections 
Democrazia Cristiana, Partito 
Comunista, Partito Socialista, Forza 
Italia, Partito Democratico dell Sinistra, 
Alleanza Nazionale (and MSI), Popolo 


















































































APPENDIX 3: ANALYSES WITH REGIONAL AUTHORITY INDEX 
 
 
Table A.2       
SPAIN: Contamination Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
National Electoral Share 1.327*** 1.436*** 1.397*** 
 (0.379) (0.396) (0.370) 
RAI Index (lag) 2.157*** 2.256 2.071 
 (0.743) (1.359) (1.424) 
National Electoral Share X RAI Index (lag) -0.036* -0.041** -0.031* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Regional Prime Minister   8.321*** 
   (1.661) 
Affiliated   0.200 
   (2.059) 
Regional PM X Affiliated   -4.859* 
   (2.752) 
Coalition Member   -3.415*** 
   (1.038) 
Days Passed   0.007* 
   (0.004) 
National Electoral Share X Days   -0.000 
   (0.000) 
Constant -32.399** -35.185 -39.059 
 (15.257) (27.157) (27.306) 
    
Region-Party Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Period Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Observations 212 212 212 
R-squared 0.446 0.468 0.531 
Number of RP (party-regions) 33 33 33 
Clustered standard errors at the region-party level in parentheses  














Table A.3       
ITALY: Contamination Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
National Electoral Share 1.088*** 1.153*** 1.041*** 
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 (0.088) (0.094) (0.103) 
RAI Index (lag) 0.102 -0.059 -0.265 
 (0.187) (0.210) (0.194) 
National Electoral Share X RAI Index (lag) -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.020* 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Regional Prime Minister   3.294*** 
   (1.203) 
Affiliated   1.330*** 
   (0.486) 
Regional PM X Affiliated   -1.862** 
   (0.931) 
Coalition Member   1.434*** 
   (0.462) 
Days Passed    0.001 
   (0.001) 
National Electoral Share X Days   -0.000* 
   (0.000) 
Constant 4.380** 7.718*** 6.356*** 
 (2.044) (2.533) (2.303) 
    
Region-Party Fixed Effects NO NO NO 
Period Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Observations 411 411 340 
Number of RP (party-regions)  124 124 117 
Clustered standard errors at the party-region level in parentheses  




















































APPENDIX 4: ANALYSES WITHOUT CLUSTERING 
 
 
Table A.4: Robustness Check. Spain without clustering at the region-party level  
 36 
 
Table A43 ROBUSTNESS. SPAIN         
No clustering  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
National Electoral Share 2.669*** 3.698*** 2.862*** 3.379*** 
 (0.787) (0.915) (0.876) (0.931) 
Self-Rule Index (lag) 7.778*** 10.500*** 8.937** 8.450** 
 (2.531) (2.816) (3.655) (3.743) 
National Electoral Share X Self Rule Index (lag) -0.158*** -0.229*** -0.163** -0.192*** 
 (0.059) (0.067) (0.069) (0.071) 
Regionalist Parties Share (lag)  0.309***  0.293** 
  (0.116)  (0.129) 
National Electoral Share X Reg. Parties Share (lag)  -0.006**  -0.006* 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant -89.545*** -131.003*** -113.318** -113.076** 
 (33.197) (37.898) (46.922) (48.100) 
     
Covariates NO NO YES YES 
Region-Party Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Period Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES 
Observations 212 211 212 211 
R-squared 0.442 0.463 0.543 0.555 
Number of RP (party-regions) 33 33 33 33 
Standard errors in parentheses, not clustered     










Table A.5: Robustness Check. Italy without clustering at the region-party level 
 
Table A.5 ROBUSTNESS. ITALY         
No Clustering Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
National Electoral Share 1.715*** 1.638*** 1.437*** 1.236*** 
 (0.215) (0.215) (0.210) (0.212) 
 37 
Self-Rule Index (lag) 1.381*** 1.332*** 0.606 0.473 
 (0.494) (0.495) (0.573) (0.565) 
National Electoral Share X Self Rule Index (lag) -0.090*** -0.082*** -0.063*** -0.041** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Regionalist Parties Share (lag)  -0.051  0.016 
  (0.056)  (0.049) 
National Electoral Share X Regionalist Parties Share 
(lag)  -0.003  -0.006*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Constant -10.376* -9.363* -2.785 -0.666 
 (5.632) (5.554) (6.453) (6.306) 
     
Covariates NO NO YES YES 
Region-Party Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO 
Period Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES 
Observations 369 369 298 298 
Number of RP (party-regions) 124 124 117 117 
Standard errors in parentheses     

















APPENDIX 5: ANALYSES WITH CONTEMPORANEOUS VALUES 
 
Table A.6: Robustness Check. Spain with contemporaneous values.  
 
Table A.6 ROBUSTNESS. SPAIN     
Contemporaneous values Model 1 Model 2 
      
National Electoral Share 1.226 1.464 
 (0.911) (0.997) 
Self-Rule Index (contemporaneous) 3.601 5.229 
 (4.567) (5.153) 
 38 
National Electoral Share X Self Rule Index (contemporaneous) -0.033 -0.048 
 (0.072) (0.077) 
Regionalist Parties Share (contemporaneous)  -0.056 
  (0.207) 
National Electoral Share X Self Rule Index (contemporaneous)  -0.002 
  (0.003) 
Constant -45.217 -65.343 
 (59.342) (65.535) 
   
Covariates YES YESs 
Region-Party Fixed Effects YES YES 
Period Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 179 179 
R-squared 0.520 0.530 
Number of RP (party-regions) 33 33 
Clustered standard errors at the region-party level in parentheses  



















Table A.7: Robustness Check. Italy with contemporaneous values. 
 
 
Table A.7 ROBUSTNESS. ITALY     
Contemporaneous values Model 1 Model 2 
      
National Electoral Share 1.287*** 0.958*** 
 (0.187) (0.151) 
Self-Rule Index (contemporaneous value) 0.008 -0.202 
 (0.425) (0.363) 
National Electoral Share X Self Rule Index (contemporaneous value) -0.046** -0.011 
 (0.019) (0.015) 
Regionalist Parties Share (contemporaneous value)  0.042 
  (0.039) 
National Electoral Share X Regionalist Parties Share (contemporaneous)  -0.010*** 
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  (0.002) 
Constant 5.769 8.713 
 (8.515) (7.984) 
   
Covariates YES YES 
Region-Party Fixed Effects NO NO 
Period Fixed Effects YES YES 
Observations 409 409 
Number of RP (party-regions) 120 120 
Clustered standard errors at the region-party level in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
